International environment agreements and the case of global warming


First, this article uses standard welfare economics to illustrate the market failure and policy coordination problems caused by transboundary pollution problems in general and global warming in particular. Secondly, a brief overview is given of the main results obtained by empirical modelling exercises that combine both cost and damage estimates for global warming. Thirdly, the theoretical conclusions are confronted with the reality of ongoing international climate negotiations and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is evaluated from an economic point of view. Finally, some recommendations are made for the design of future climate warming, externalities, international environmental agreements, Nash equilibrium, cost efficiency, participation constraints, equity, Kyoto Protocol

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Last time updated on 06/07/2012

This paper was published in Research Papers in Economics.

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