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The credibility of the monetary policy "free lunch"

By James Yetman

Abstract

JEL Classification: E52credibility, monetary policy

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Citations

  1. (2003). 18Appendix 1 To solve the price level targeting model under optimal discretionary policy, optimal discretionary monetary policy will satisfy Vt = minEt[Lt + βVt+1], (A1) where the relevent terms of Vt are Vt
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