Article thumbnail

Rational Addiction to Cinema? A Dynamic Panel Analysis of European Countries.

By Andrea Sisto and Roberto Zanola


A number of papers have empirically investigated the rational addiction model proposed by Becker and Murphy (1988) by using data on different harmful drugs, like cigarettes, alcohol, caffeine, opium, cocaine; but also activities independent of a biological or pharmaceutical dependency have been analysed, such as gambling, calorie consumption, news, arts, and cinema. The purpose of this paper is to extend previous works on cinema demand by using pooled cross-section and time-series data on thirteen European countries over the period 1989-2002. The estimation results provide a strong evidence that cinema consumption conforms to a rational addiction hypothesis.

OAI identifier:

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.

Suggested articles


  1. (2002). A Theory of Rational Junk-Food Consumption”,
  2. (1982). ALCHIAN (1978), “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,”
  3. (1995). An Empirical Analysis of Alcohol Addiction: Result from the Monitoring the Future Panels”,
  4. (2001). An empirical analysis of milk addiction”,
  5. (1994). An Epirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction”,
  6. (2003). Building Strong National Movie Industries: the Case of Spain”,
  7. (1997). Cinema Demand in Spain: A Cointegration Analysis”,
  8. (2001). Corruption, connections and transparency: Does a better screen imply a better scene?”,
  9. (1999). Critical values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple Regressors”,
  10. (1981). Estimation in Dynamic Models with Error Components”,
  11. (2001). Explaining Post-War Cinema Attendance in Great Britain”,
  12. (2003). Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from Regional Health Expenditure
  13. (1993). Gambling as a Rational Addiction”,
  14. (1997). Is Health Care really a luxury?”.
  15. (1990). Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inferences on Cointegration with Applications to the Demand for Money”,
  16. (2000). n. 10* Rosella Levaggi and Roberto Zanola, The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the Italian National Health System
  17. (2000). n. 11** Silvano Belligni, Magistrati e politici nella crisi italiana. Democrazia dei guardiani e neopopulismo
  18. (2000). n. 12** Gabriella Silvestrini, Il concetto di «governo della legge» nella tradizione repubblicana.
  19. (2000). n. 13* Roberto Zanola, Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy
  20. (2000). n. 14* Daniele Bondonio, Metodi per la valutazione degli aiuti alle imprse con specifico target territoriale
  21. (2000). n. 15* Marilena Locatelli-Biey and Roberto Zanola, The Market for Sculptures: An Adjacent Year Regression Index
  22. (2000). n. 16* Guido Ortona, On the Xenophobia of non-discriminated Ethnic Minorities
  23. (2001). n. 19* Stefania Ravazzi, La lettura contemporanea del cosiddetto dibattito fra Hobbes e Hume
  24. (1999). n. 2* Guido Ortona, Una politica di emergenza contro la disoccupazione semplice, efficace equasi efficiente.
  25. (2001). n. 20* Stefania Ottone, L'altruismo: atteggiamento irrazionale, strategia vincente o amore per il prossimo?
  26. (2001). n. 21* Claudia Canegallo, Una valutazione delle carriere dei giovani lavoratori atipici: la fedeltà aziendale premia?
  27. (2001). n. 22* Carla Marchese and Fabio Privileggi, Who participates in tax amnesties? Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers
  28. (2001). n. 23* Alberto Cassone and Carla Marchese, Should the death tax die? And should it leave an inheritance?
  29. (2001). n. 24* Ferruccio Ponzano, Efficiency wages and endogenous supervision technology
  30. (2002). n. 26** Guido Franzinetti, Le Elezioni Galiziane al Reichsrat di Vienna,
  31. (2002). n. 28* Daniele Bondonio, Evaluating the Employment Impact of Business Incentive Programs in EU Disadvantaged Areas. A case from
  32. (2002). n. 29* Marcello Montefiori, Libertà di scelta e contratti prospettici: l’asimmetria informativa nel mercato delle cure sanitarie ospedaliere
  33. (1999). n. 3* Mario Poma, Benefici economici e ambientali dei diritti di inquinamento: il caso della riduzione dell’acido cromico dai reflui industriali.
  34. (2002). n. 30* Franco Amisano, La corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia di tipo concorrenziale: modelli di analisi economica.
  35. (2002). n. 31** Silvano Belligni, Francesco Ingravalle, Guido Ortona, Pasquale Pasquino, Michel Senellart, Trasformazioni della politica. Contributi al seminario di Teoria politica
  36. (2002). n. 33* Mario Ferrero, Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic model of islamic extremism
  37. (1999). n. 4** Guido Ortona, A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well.
  38. (1999). n. 5* Luigi Montrucchio and Fabio Privileggi, On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models of Lucas-Type
  39. (1999). n. 6* Carla Marchese and Fabio Privileggi, Taxpayers Attitudes Towaer Risk and Amnesty Partecipation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case.
  40. (1999). n. 7** Silvano Belligni, Corruzione, malcostume amministrativo e strategie etiche. Il ruolo dei codici.
  41. (1999). n. 8* Claudia Canegallo, Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica
  42. (1999). n. 9* Mario Ferrero, A model of the political enterprise
  43. (1991). Notes: Instruments used are 3 lagged and 2 led levels of both explanatory variables and dependent variable. Regression includes T-1 time and N-1 country dummy variables but their estimates are non reported to save space. Arellano and Bond
  44. (1999). Rational Addiction and Alcohol Consumption: Evidence from the Nordic Countries”,
  45. (1999). Rational Addiction and the Demand for Cinema”,
  46. (1996). Rational Addiction to Caffeine: An Analysis of Coffee Consumption”
  47. (2004). Rational Addiction to Cinema? A Dynamic Panel Analisis of European Countries
  48. (2002). Rational Addiction to News?”, Habit Formation and Print Media Usage,
  49. (1999). Rational Addiction, the Consumption of Calories, and Body Weight”, PhD Thesis,
  50. (2001). Rationally Addicted to Drinking and Smoking?”,
  51. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an application to Employment Equations”,
  52. Table 2. F-tests for pooling the data Variable F-test Test for pooling 1: DYprii,t 0.54 DYinci,t 0.19 DYscri,t 0.14 DYmovi,t 0.12 DY 0.23 Notes: For testing the hypothesis of pooling the following augmented models have been estimated: admi,t
  53. (1997). Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panel”, Working paper,
  54. (1998). The Demand for Cocaine by Young Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach”,
  55. (1995). The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of opium in the Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938”,
  56. (1995). Why do People Drink? Tests of the Rational Addiction Model”,