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The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying

By J.J.M. Potters and F.A.A.M. van Winden


This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.Game Theory;Lobbying

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