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Central Bank Transparency and Shocks

By Daniel Laskar

Abstract

According to the literature, in an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model, opacity is always preferred to transparency on central bank forecasts. By modelling the private sector's behavior explicitly, we show that transparency reduces the shocks. Consequently, transparency can be preferred.central bank, transparency, Phillips curve, shocks.

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  6. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,
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