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Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Wighted Welfare and Price Competition

By Máximo Sedano Hoyuelos and Juan Carlos Bárcena Ruiz

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (wighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weigth given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also anlyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer suspluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.mixed duopoly, price competition, endogenous timing, weighted welfare

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