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Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

By Gill David and Sgroi Daniel

Abstract

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

OAI identifier: oai:RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:11
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