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Decentralization and local public goods: getting the incentives right

By James Roumasset

Abstract

The paper addresses the nature and locus of appropriate government control in the provision of collective services. It suggests some useful principles for determining organizational structures with the appropriate degree and form of decentralization, which is seen to be an important part of incentive compatibility. In the case of low-income housing it cites the privatization of sites and services and devolution of upgrading as two promising models of decentralization.decentralization, incentive compatible, devolution

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