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Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining

By Vincent J. Vannetelbosch


This paper deals with N-person sequential bargaining games with complete information. For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements. Adopting a non-equilibrium approach, we show that N-person sequential bargaining games with exit are solvable by a refinement of rationalizability for multi-stage games (trembling-hand rationalizability) whatever the impatience of the players. That is, once we adopt the non-equilibrium approach, the exit opportunity still fulfils its original aim: we achieve a unique solution by introducing the exit opportunity. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique SPE.Sequential bargaining, N-person, Rationalizability.

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