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Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

By Davide Ferrari, Barbara Pistoresi and Francesco Salsano

Abstract

We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).ICentral Bank independence; institutional systems; variable selection

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