Second-Hand Markets and Collusion byManufacturers of Semidurable Goods


The focus of the present work is to study the impact of the second-hand market the collusivebehavior. I analyze firms' preferences for having an active second-hand market and whetherpolicies (i.e. leasing policy, buy-back policy and warranty policy) that affect the functioningof the second-hand market strengthen collusion. I show how collective incentives to adoptstrategies that strengthen collusion often differ from monopoly incentives to achieve higherprofits.Bertrand competition, buy-back policies, collusion, leasing, semi-durability,second-hand market, warranty.

Similar works

Full text


Research Papers in Economics

Provided a free PDF
Last time updated on 7/6/2012View original full text link

This paper was published in Research Papers in Economics.

Having an issue?

Is data on this page outdated, violates copyrights or anything else? Report the problem now and we will take corresponding actions after reviewing your request.