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Local public education and childless voting : the arising of an "ends with the middle" coalition

By Berardino Cesi

Abstract

We show that capitalization of local education into the housing price induces childless voters to support local education. In particular, low income childless households vote for a tax raise when capitalization is strong, whereas high income childless supports a higher tax when capitalization is weak. The median income voter is never pivotal because "ends with the middle" coalitions arise: high income households (with and without a child) makes coalition with middle income class with a child, whereas low income households (with and without a child) make coalition with childless middle income class. We …nd that the income of the childless median voter is higher than the median income, whereas median voter with a child has income lower than the median. Thus the equilibrium tax preferred by the median voter (childless or not), is higher than the tax preferred by the childless median income voter and lower than the tax preferred by the median income voter with a child. This result implies that it is not possible to exclude voting equilibria in which thelocal public education; housings; local tax; capitalization; childless voting

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