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Credence goods, experts and risk aversion

By O. Bonroy, S. Lemarié and J.P. Tropéano


The existing literature in expert-customer relationship concludes that when: i) consumers are homogenous, ii) consumers are committed with an an expert once this one made a recommendation, and iii) the type of treatment provided is verifiable, an expert finds optimal to serve efficiently his customers. This work shows that the previous result may not occur when consumers are not risk-neutral. Our result, that holds in a monopoly setting and under Bertrand competition, suggests that risk averse consumers have more likely to be mistreated by experts.CREDENCE GOODS;EXPERT SERVICES;RISK AVERSION

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