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A few can do: Ethical behavior and the provision of public goods in an agent-based model

By Michael Pickhardt


In this paper I examine the influence which a population of different behavioral types may have on the provision of public goods. In particular, the population or subject pool consists of three behavioral types: myopic selfish agents, enlightened selfish agents and ethically motivated agents. I use a simple agent-based simulation approach that incorporates type interaction based on forward-looking conditional cooperation within a standard linear public goods model. Among other things, I show that under the given circumstances non-provision of public goods is a negligible issue, even if the share of ethically motivated types in the population is rather small. --Linear Public Goods Games,Conditional Cooperation,Ethical Behavior,Agentbased Modeling,Pareto-optimality

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