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Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics

By Andriy Zapechelnyuk


Consider a repeated game where all players follow no-regret strategies by reinforcing the actions that they regret not having played enough in the past. We show that a resulting no-regret dynamic approaches in the long run a best-response dynamic and leads to its invariant sets: rest points (Nash equilibria) or periodic orbits. The convergence results for best-response dynamics known in the literature immediately apply to no-regret dynamics. Thus, every no-regret dynamic leads to Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games, weighted potential and two-player ordinal potential games, supermodular games with diminishing returns, and some other special classes.Regret minimization, no-regret strategy, best-response dynamic, Nash equilibrium, Shapley polygon, curb set

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