Location of Repository

The Organization of Regulated Production: Complementarities, Correlation and Collusion.

By Jos Jansen, Doh-Shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci
OAI identifier: oai:RePEc:ner:toulou:http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/2064/

Suggested articles

Preview

Citations

  1. 23Che and Kim (2006a) consider neither ratifiability nor multiplicity in their analysis.
  2. (1993). A Theory of Incentives
  3. (1994). An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information,
  4. (2004). Colluding on Participation Decisions.” Working Paper,
  5. (2005). Collusion as an Informed Principal Problem.” Working Paper,
  6. (2002). Collusion Under Asymmetric Information: The Role of the
  7. (1988). Full Extraction of surplus in
  8. (1983). Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and
  9. (2006). Measuring Economies of Vertical Integration in Network Industries: An Application to the Water Sector.”
  10. (2005). Mechanism Design under Collusion and Uniform Transfers.”
  11. (1999). Multidimensional Screening: A User’s guide.”
  12. (2004). Optimal Collusion and Optimal Auctions.” Working Paper,
  13. (2006). Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions.”, mimeo,
  14. (2005). Optimal Second-degree Price Discrimination and Arbitrage: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among
  15. (1995). Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from
  16. (1995). Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis.”
  17. (1994). Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience.”
  18. (1993). The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries.”
  19. (2004). The Organization of Supplier Networks:
  20. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model.” Princeton,
  21. (2005). The Value of Information and Optimal Organization.” Working Paper,

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.