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On Technology Transfer to an Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly

By X. Henry Wang and Bill Yang

Abstract

This note studies the transfer of a cost-reducing innovation from an independent patent-holder to an asymmetric Cournot duopoly that has different unit costs of production. It is found that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing for the independent patent-holder.Cournot duopoly

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Citations

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