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A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules

By Juan D. Moreno-Ternero


We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud.

OAI identifier: oai:RePEc:pab:wpaper:10.15

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