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Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002

By William M. Chandler, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins

Abstract

We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties’ (and not government parties’) roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties sky- rocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government

Topics: Parliamentary practice, Germany, Political science, Comparative and Foreign Law, Law, Law and Politics, Legislation, Models and Methods
Publisher: Duke University School of Law
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:scholarship.law.duke.edu:faculty_scholarship-5972

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