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On mental privacy: the having of mental states

By Simon David Dembitzer

Abstract

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references: p. 59-61Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.In three chapters this thesis seeks to demonstrate that (i) there historically has been no consensus in the use of the term 'mental privacy' and that several problematic doctrines are based on confused accounts of this term; (ii) there are contemporary debates which are maintained, in large order, by the opposing sides subscribing to different notions of mental privacy; and (iii) a preliminary investigation makes clear that both mental states with propositional content and mental states with non-propositional content are private in that both require the agent to have the state

Topics: philosophy., Major philosophy.
Publisher: Texas A&M University
Year: 1998
OAI identifier: oai:oaktrust.library.tamu.edu:1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1998-THESIS-D465
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