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Doing without representation: coping with Dreyfus

By J. Webber


Hubert Dreyfus argues that the traditional and currently dominant conception of an action, as an event\ud initiated or governed by a mental representation of a possible state of affairs that the agent is trying to realise, is\ud inadequate. If Dreyfus is right, then we need a new conception of action. I argue, however, that the\ud considerations that Dreyfus adduces show only that an action need not be initiated or governed by a conceptual\ud representation, but since a representation need not be conceptually structured, do not show that we need a\ud conception of action that does not involve representation

Publisher: Routledge
Year: 2002
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