By adopting a multilevel approach to understanding decisions taken in security and defence policies\ud by European member states, the paper argues that the development of the European Security and\ud Defence Policy, the proliferation of ad-hoc coalitions of the willing, and the subcontracting of\ud security tasks from the UN has worsened the challenge of parliamentary accountability in foreign,\ud security and defence policies.\ud The paper evaluates how the European Convention has sought to bridge the parliamentary\ud accountability gap in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in European Security and\ud Defence Policy (ESDP). The outcomes of the Convention on the future of Europe are not meeting\ud its initial ambition to put foreign, security and defence policy among the priorities for the European\ud Union¿s constitutional design. CFSP will become more integrated, on an intergovernmental rather\ud than supranational model and under the large states¿ control. The major innovation is the creation\ud of the position of Foreign Affairs Minister whose autonomy remains still uncertain, especially in\ud his/her relationship with the President of the European Council. ESDP¿s operational capabilities\ud and scope are both extended while coalitions of the willing are institutionalised and a defence core\ud group could emerge. The contrast remains between a slower integration of CFSP and a faster progress\ud of ESDP.\ud Given the significance of proposals in ESDP, the new powers proposed by the European Convention\ud to be given to national parliaments and the European Parliament in this policy area are too weak to\ud close the existing parliamentary accountability gap
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