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Damages in EC antitrust actions: who pays the piper?

By Alan Riley and John Peysner

Abstract

The prospects for private antitrust enforcement to supplement public enforcement by competition authorities in the EC depends on the mix of incentives and disincentives for private parties to bring action. The perceived advantages that underpin US antitrust litigation; namely, treble damages and wide discovery, can be replicated in the EC by awards of interest and damages above pure compensatory level in specific cases and the leniency procedure can be mined for useful documentation. However, the advantage of access to the courts through contingency fees has limited appeal in Europe and a Contingency Legal Aid Fund, incorporating private and public elements, is proposed

Topics: M120 European Union Law
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lincoln.ac.uk:882
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