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'The good man is the measure of all things': objectivity without world-centredness in Aristotle's moral epistemology

By Timothy Chappell

Abstract

I begin by contrasting Aristotle's 'world-centred' general epistemology, and his 'mind-centred' (more exactly, 'agathos-centred�) moral epistemology. I argue that Aristotle takes this approach, not because he doubts the objectivity of ethics, nor because he is an 'ethical particularist' (whatever one of those is), but because of the reflexive nature of ethics as a study. I further argue that, by taking the notion that 'the good man is the measure of all things' as central to Aristotle's ethics, we can see how to unify coherently the rather embarrassingly diverse ethical resources that Aristotle offers us

Publisher: Oxford University Press
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:oro.open.ac.uk:5179
Provided by: Open Research Online

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