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Chances, counterfactuals and similarity

By J.R.G. Williams

Abstract

John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.\ud I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal than is Lewis’s own suggested modification

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3357

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