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Truthmakers and necessary connections

By R.P. Cameron

Abstract

In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis' 'Things-qua-truthmakers' theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3-5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3729

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