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Turtles all the way down: regress, priority and fundamentality in metaphysics

By R.P. Cameron

Abstract

This paper is a discussion of an intuition commonly held by metaphysicians: that there must be a fundamental layer of reality; that chains of ontological dependence must terminate; that there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss application of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best

Publisher: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Club and the University of St Andrews
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:3737

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