Truthmakers and modality

Abstract

This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form or . In section 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In section 2 I criticise Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths. In section 3 I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In section 4 I discuss, and dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In section 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem

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    This paper was published in White Rose Research Online.

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