Location of Repository

On the Economics of Integrated Ticketing

By J. McHardy, M. Reynolds and S. Trotter

Abstract

In this paper we explore alternative pricing and regulatory strategies within a simple transport network with Cournot duopoly and differentiated demands. We show that whilst firms always prefer to offer integrated ticketing, a social planner will not. With integrated ticketing, the firms always prefer complete collusion but there is not a uniform ranking of some of the less collusive regimes. Society generally prefers the less collusive regimes to complete collusion but prefers some collusion to independent pricing

Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Sheffield
Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:9913

Suggested articles

Preview


To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.