Location of Repository

Strategic Behaviour of Firms in a Duopoly\ud and the Impact of Extending the Patenting Period

By H. Brown, A.R. Hole and J. Roberts

Abstract

This paper deals with strategic behaviour of firms in a duopoly, subsequent to the\ud claim by one firm that it has reduced the unit cost of production. A variety of possible\ud strategic equilibria are discussed in the context of a duopoly game between a multinational\ud and a local firm. In the context of an extended uniform period of patenting, as finally\ud agreed in the Uruguay round (1994), firms have increased incentive to take patents.\ud In the presence of cost differences, the act of taking process-patents has implications for\ud the equilibrium output strategies of the duopoly firms and sometimes may have a negative\ud overall welfare effect for the local producer and consumers

Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Sheffield
Year: 2010
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.whiterose.ac.uk:10899

Suggested articles

Preview


To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.