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Individually-rational collective choice

By Andrés M. Carvajal


There is a collection of exogenously given socially-feasible sets, and, for each one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually-feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually-feasible sets is larger than the socially-feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individual choices. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I characterize rationalizable collective choices

Topics: HB
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Year: 2007
OAI identifier:

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