Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Vertical restraints and competition policy

By Michael Waterson and Paul Dobson


This report considers the private and social welfare effects of vertical restraints - whereby contractual arrangements between suppliers (manufacturers) and distributors (retailers) extend beyond simple arms-length pricing. It seeks to synthesise and extend existing theory on vertical restraints, so as to identify the conditions where detrimental effects are likely to dominate benign social welfare effects, and vice versa, with the aim of developing a practical framework for the analysis of vertical restraints

Topics: HC
Publisher: Office of Fair Trading
Year: 1996
OAI identifier:

Suggested articles


  1. (1990). A new test of price-concentration relationship in grocery retailing", doi
  2. (1978). Advertising and Welfare", doi
  3. (1952). American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, doi
  4. (1984). An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints", doi
  5. (1986). Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price", doi
  6. (1976). Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, doi
  7. (1992). Antitrust regulation and the restructuring of grocery retailing doi
  8. (1979). Beef Wholesale-Retail Marketing Margins and Concentration", doi
  9. (1987). Business Strategy and Retailing, doi
  10. (1989). Can Resale Price Maintenance or Franchise Fees Correct Sub-Optimal Levels of Retail Service?", doi
  11. (1985). Comments on Marvel; how fair is fair trade?", doi
  12. (1993). Competition Law, 3rd edition, doi
  13. (1990). Competition-Reducing Vertical Restraints",
  14. (1989). Concentration and price in gasoline retailing",
  15. (1987). Contracts as a Barrier to Entry",
  16. (1987). Do the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?",
  17. (1991). Duopolistic Vertical Restraints", doi
  18. (1991). Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets", doi
  19. (1993). Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly", doi
  20. (1994). European Retailing: Convergence, Differences and Perspectives", doi
  21. (1992). Exclusive Dealing Contracts in a Successive Duopoly with Side Payments", doi
  22. (1994). Exclusive dealing in a spatial model of retail competition", doi
  23. (1983). Exclusive Dealing in Distribution",
  24. (1994). Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Intra- and Interbrand Competition",
  25. (1982). Exclusive Dealing", doi
  26. (1995). Exclusive Trading Contracts in Successive Differentiated Duopoly", forthcoming in Southern Economic doi
  27. (1994). Exclusivity Agreements between Manufacturers and Retailers", mimeo,
  28. (1994). Industrial Economics: Economic Analysis and Public Policy, 2nd edition,
  29. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Third Edition,
  30. (1987). Interfirm rivalry in a repeated game: an empirical test of tacit collusion", doi
  31. (1991). Intrabrand Competition: Stepchild of Antitrust",
  32. (1986). Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont", doi
  33. (1994). Mergers Commission doi
  34. Mergers Commission (1989a), The Supply of Beer, Cm 651,
  35. Mergers Commission (1989b), Grand Metropolitan plc and William Hill Organisation Limited, Cm 776,
  36. Mergers Commission (1990a), The Supply of Petrol, Cm 972,
  37. (1991). Mergers Commission (1990b), Kingfisher plc and Dixons Group plc,
  38. Mergers Commission (1992a), New Motor Cars, Cm 1808,
  39. Mergers Commission (1992b), Motor Car Parts, Cm 1818,
  40. Mergers Commission (1992c), The Supply of Matches and Disposable Cigarette Lighters, Cm 1854,
  41. Mergers Commission (1993a), Contact Lens Solutions, Cm 2242,
  42. Mergers Commission (1993c), Fine Fragrances, Cm 2380,
  43. Mergers Commission (1993d), The Supply of National Newspapers, Cm 2427,
  44. Mergers Commission (1994a), Ice Cream, Cm 2524,
  45. Mergers Commission (1994b), The Supply of Recorded Music, Cm 2599,
  46. (1975). Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation", doi
  47. (1985). Office of Fair Trading doi
  48. (1993). On the Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing", doi
  49. (1983). On Vertical Control in Monopolistic Competition", doi
  50. (1988). On Vertical Restraints and the Law: A Note", doi
  51. (1994). Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development doi
  52. (1955). Prerequisites and effects of resale price maintenance", doi
  53. (1981). Prices and Concentration in the Food Retailing Industry", doi
  54. (1976). Product Selection, Fixed Costs and Monopolistic Competition", doi
  55. (1985). Resale price maintenance and antitrust policy", doi
  56. (1985). Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels",
  57. (1984). Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification", doi
  58. (1985). Resale price maintenance and the problem of marginal and inframarginal consumers", doi
  59. (1966). Resale Price Maintenance in Practice, George Allen and Unwin: Hemel
  60. (1983). Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics staff report:
  61. (1988). Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation", doi
  62. (1990). Restructuring Retailing: Changing patterns of competition and their implications for public policy",
  63. (1993). Retail concentration and the internationalization of British grocery retailing",
  64. (1990). Some Economics of Exclusive Purchasing Obligations",
  65. (1993). Strategic Motives for Vertical Separation: Evidence from Retail Gasoline", Economics Discussion Paper No. doi
  66. (1989). Structural Change in the European Food Chain",
  67. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox; A Policy at War With Itself, Basic Books: doi
  68. (1990). The Changing Character of Retailer-Supplier Relationships",
  69. (1987). The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements:
  70. (1987). The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment,"
  71. (1985). The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements",
  72. (1991). The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing", doi
  73. (1954). The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, doi
  74. (1986). The Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution", doi
  75. (1983). The Economics of Vertical Restraints",
  76. (1994). The Effects of Exclusive Purchasing on Interbrand and Intrabrand Rivalry", Warwick Economics Working Paper No.
  77. (1979). The Food Retailing Industry: Market Structure, Profits and Prices,
  78. (1993). The Internationalization of Retailing",
  79. (1986). The Logic of Vertical Restraints",
  80. (1981). The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality", doi
  81. (1992). The Puppet Show: Changing Buyer-Supplier Relationships within Clothing Retailing", doi
  82. (1994). The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition", doi
  83. (1966). The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept", doi
  84. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization, doi
  85. (1990). Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion", doi
  86. (1990). United States Antitrust Policy: Issues and Institutions",
  87. (1989). Vertical Contractual Relations", doi
  88. (1993). Vertical Control and Price versus Nonprice Competition", doi
  89. (1992). Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts", doi
  90. (1950). Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy", doi
  91. (1990). Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure", doi
  92. (1986). Vertical Integration and Related Variations on a TransactionCost Economics Theme",
  93. (1993). Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints", doi
  94. (1983). Vertical Integration in a Monopolistically Competitive Industry", doi
  95. (1988). Vertical Restraints and Producers' doi
  96. (1986). Vertical Restraints from a Principal-Agent Viewpoint",
  97. (1988). Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation", doi
  98. (1990). Vertical Restraints in European Competition Policy", doi
  99. (1991). Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information", doi
  100. (1985). Vertical Restraints", doi
  101. (1988). Vertical Separation", doi
  102. (1960). Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?", doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.