Location of Repository

Understanding the truth about subjectivity

By M. G. Rowley and Elizabeth J. Robinson

Abstract

Results of two experiments show children’s understanding of diversity in personal preference is incomplete. Despite acknowledging diversity, in Experiment 1(N=108), 6-\ud and 8-year-old children were less likely than adults to see preference as a legitimate basis for personal tastes and more likely to say a single truth could be found about a matter of taste. In Experiment 2 (N=96), 7- and 9-year-olds were less likely than 11- and 13-yearolds to say a dispute about a matter of preference might not be resolved. These data suggest that acceptance of the possibility of diversity does not indicate an adult-like understanding of subjectivity. An understanding of the relative emphasis placed on objective and subjective factors in different contexts continues to develop into adolescence

Topics: BF
Publisher: Blackwell
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:51

Suggested articles

Preview

Citations

  1. (1980). A theory of cognitive development: The control and construction of hierarchies of skills. doi
  2. (2003). American and British college students’ epistemological beliefs about research on psychological and biological development. doi
  3. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. doi
  4. (2000). Children’s understanding of pre-existing differences in knowledge and belief. doi
  5. (2002). Competing claims about competing knowledge claims. In
  6. (1996). Developing organization of mental verbs: Evidence for the development of a constructivist theory of mind in middle childhood. doi
  7. (1998). Domain differences in the epistemological beliefs of college students.
  8. (2003). Faultless Disagreement. doi
  9. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years. doi
  10. (2002). Future challenges and directions for theory and research on personal epistemology. In
  11. (1985). Justifications offered by children to support positions on issues of “fact” and “opinion”. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association,
  12. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: The truth about false belief. doi
  13. (1996). On the distinction between false belief understanding and subscribing to an interpretive theory of mind. doi
  14. (1990). Relativism and stations of epistemic doubt. doi
  15. (2002). Skills, tasks, and definitions: Discrepancies in the understanding and data on the development of folk epistemology. doi
  16. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. doi
  17. (2000). The development of epistemological understanding. doi
  18. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. doi
  19. (1992). The rediscovery of mind. doi
  20. (1991). The skills of argument. Cambridge. doi
  21. (2000). Theory of mind, metacognition, and reasoning: A life-span perspective. In
  22. (1997). Toward the integration of objectivity and subjectivity: A longitudinal study of epistemological developmentUnderstanding Subjectivity 33 between the ages of 9 and 13. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
  23. (2002). What is epistemological thinking and why does it matter? In
  24. (1990). Young children’s understanding of fact beliefs versus value beliefs. doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.