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Plans, prices, and corruption : the Soviet firm under partial centralization, 1930 to 1990

By Mark Harrison and Kim Byung-Yeon

Abstract

On the basis of new historical research on the Soviet command system we analyze the choices of a plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the quality of corruption. We show that the performance of the Soviet economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s\ud was accompanied by increased privatization of rents

Topics: HC
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:59
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