In this paper, we investigate the problem of the strategic foundation of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach. To this end, we
respecify à la Cournot-Walras the mixed version of a model of simultaneous, noncooperative exchange, originally proposed by Lloyd S.
Shapley. We show, through an example, that the set of the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium allocations of this respecifcation does not coincide
with the set of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the mixed
version of the original Shapley's model. As the nonequivalence, in a
one-stage setting, can be explained by the intrinsic two-stage nature of
the Cournot-Walras equilibrium concept, we are led to consider a further reformulation of the Shapley's model as a two-stage game, where
the atoms move in the first stage and the atomless sector moves in
the second stage. Our main result shows that the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations coincides with a specific set of subgame
perfect equilibrium allocations of this two-stage game, which we call
the set of the Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium allocations
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