Location of Repository

Do elections always motivate incumbents? : learning vs. re-election concerns

By Eric Le Borgne and Ben Lockwood

Abstract

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.\u

Topics: HB
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:269
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/269/... (external link)
  • Suggested articles

    Citations

    1. (1995). and C.Mezzetti (1997), “Politicians’ Decision-making with Re-Election Concerns”, doi
    2. and M.Smart (2003), “Does Tax Competition Raise Voter Welfare?”.mimeo, London School of Economics.
    3. B e s l e y ,T .a n dS .C o a t e( 1997), “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy ”, doi
    4. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures” American Political Science Review 87, doi
    5. (2003). Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability”, Working Paper 0318,
    6. (1986). Incumbent Performance and Electoral doi
    7. (1999). Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective”, Review of Economic Studies, doi
    8. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, doi
    9. (1997). Separation of Powers and Political Accountability", doi
    10. (1999). The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies”, doi

    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.