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Sovereign debt default: the impact of creditor composition

By Amrita Dhillon, Javier I. García Fronti and Lei Zhang

Abstract

The main motivation of this paper is to study the impact of the composition of creditors on the probability of default and the risk premium on sovereign bonds, when there is debtor moral hazard. In the absence of any legal enforcement, relational contracts work only when there are creditors who have a repeated relationship with the borrower. We show that ownership structures with a larger fraction of long term lenders are associated with a lower default probability and lower risk premia. Moreover, competitive markets structures lead to loss in efficiency as well when there is moral hazard, in contrast to the case with perfect enforceability and information

Topics: HJ
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2009
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1316

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