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A behavioral power index

By Serguei Kaniovski and Dennis Leech


We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or assumed voting patterns conveyed by a joint probability distribution on the set of voting outcomes, and apply it to the voting data of the Supreme Court of the United States

Topics: BF
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2009
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