Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

How much control is enough? Monitoring and enforcement under Stalin

By Andreĭ Markevich

Abstract

Given wide scope for asymmetric information in huge hierarchies agents have a large capacity for opportunistic behaviour. Hidden actions increase transactions costs and cause the demand for monitoring and enforcement. Once the latter are costly, this raises questions about their scope, logistics and type. Using historical records, this paper examines the Stalin’s answers to them. We find that Stalin maximised efficiency of the Soviet system of control but had to mitigate with the problems of the loyalty of inspectors themselves and the necessity to lessen the risk of a “chaos of orders” arising from parallel centres of power

Topics: HC, DK
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1385

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (1957). Factory and Manager in the USSR. doi
  2. Features and functions of supreme audit institutions, doi
  3. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analyses and Antitrust Implications.
  4. Parkinson's Law: The Pursuit of Progress.
  5. (1998). Pillars of Integrity: The Importance of Supreme Audit Institutions in Curbing Corruption. International Bank for Reconstruction
  6. (2006). Quality, Experience, and Monopoly: the Soviet Market for Weapons under Stalin, Economic History Review, doi
  7. (1987). State control in Soviet Russia: the rise and fall of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, doi
  8. (1998). The political economy of dictatorship. doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.