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Cartels and search

By Norman J. Ireland and Michael Waterson

Abstract

This paper unifies two significant but somewhat contradictory ideas. First, search costs potentially influence market price equilibria significantly; in many equilibria consumers do not search despite above-competitive prices. Second, cartels must guard against individual members offering lower prices, thereby creating incentives for consumers to search. We develop a simple framework, and then an example, in which whether search takes place depends upon the magnitude of search costs. Three potential equilibria result, dependent upon model parameters. These include a tacit cartel agreement exhibiting price variance and volatility. A policy conclusion is that such market characteristics do not always guarantee non-cartelisation

Topics: HF, HB
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1429

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Citations

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