Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity

By Edward Cartwright and Myrna Holtz Wooders


Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make his action choice conditional on his role. Our main result demonstrates that `near to' any correlated equilibrium is an approximate correlated equilibrium `with conformity' -- that is, an equilibrium where all `similar players' play the same strategy, have the same probability of being allocated to each role, and receive approximately the same payoff; in short, similar players `behave in an identical way' and are treated nearly equally. To measure `similarity' amongst players we introduce the notions of approximate substitutes and a (delta,Q)-class games -- a game with Q classes of players where all players in the same class are delta-substitutes for each other

Topics: HB
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2004
OAI identifier:

Suggested articles


  1. (1995). A theory of focal points,” doi
  2. (2005). Adaptive heuristics”, doi
  3. (2003). Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs,” doi
  4. (2001). Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players,” doi
  5. (1987). Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality,” doi
  6. (1996). Equilibrium in evolutionary games: Some experimental results,” doi
  7. (1997). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,H a r v a r dU n i v e r s i t y doi
  8. (2003). Learning to play approximate nash equilibria in games with many players, doi
  9. (1997). On the origin of convention: evidence from coordination games,” doi
  10. (1987). Rationalizability and correlated equilibria,” doi
  11. (2001). Social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players,” doi
  12. (2002). Some experimental evidence on the evolution of discrimination, cooperation and perceptions of fairness,” doi
  13. (1974). Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”, doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.