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Laws of scarcity for a finite game: exact bounds on estimations

By Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Holtz Wooders

Abstract

A "Law of Scarcity" is that scarceness is rewarded. We demonstrate laws of scarcity for cores and aproximate cores of games. Furthermore, we show that equal treatment core payoff vectors satisfy a condition of cyclic monotonicity. Our results are developed for parameterized collections of games and exact bounds on the maximum possible deviation of approximate core payoff vectors from satisfying a law of scarcity are stated in terms of the parameters describing the games. We note that the parameters can, in principle, be estimated

Topics: QA
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1496

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