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Conformity and bounded rationality in games with many players

By Edward Cartwright and Myrna Holtz Wooders

Abstract

Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where e can be chosen to be small

Topics: HB
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2003
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1500

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Citations

  1. (2002). Ex-post stability in large games,” doi
  2. (2002). Social conformity in games with many players,” doi
  3. Wooders (2003a) “Bounded rationality in arbitrary games with many players,” doi
  4. Wooders (2003b) “On approximate equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players,” doi

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