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Representing games as coalition production economies with public goods

By Antoni Meseguer-Artola, Myrna Holtz Wooders and Juan-Enrique Martínez-Legaz
Topics: HB
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2003
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  8. (1974). Market representations of n-person games,” doi
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  12. (1983). The epsilon core of a large replica game,” doi
  13. (2001). Tiebout economics with di¤erential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics,” doi
  14. Wooders (1999a) “Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs,” doi
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