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Corporate governance and the public interest

By J. Robert Branston, Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden


A theory of the firm based on strategic decision-making highlights governance as a central issue. Preferences vary over strategy but not all interests are currently being represented, resulting in a failure to govern in the public interest. As solutions, we consider the design of\ud company law and also more immediate ways forward, focusing on regulation and democratically controlled public agencies, but stressing the fundamental significance of active, effective citizens. Throughout, the arguments are illustrated using examples from various countries and industries, including education, information technology, football and public utilities in Europe and the US

Topics: HD
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
OAI identifier:

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