Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Some first results for noncooperative pregames: social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies

By Myrna Holtz Wooders, Reinhard Selten and Edward Cartwright

Abstract

We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and\ud demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (E) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to construct an E-equilibrium in pure strategies — ours is an 'E-purification’ result. Our main result is that there exists an E-equilibrium in pure strategies with the property that most players choose the same strategies as all other players with similar attributes. More precisely, there is an integer L, depending on E but not on the number of players, so that any sufficiently large society can be partitioned into fewer than L groups, or cultures, consisting of similar players, and all players in the same group play the same pure strategy. In ongoing research, we are extending the model to cover a broader class of situations, including incomplete information.\ud \ud We would be grateful for any comments that might help us improve the paper

Topics: HB, QA
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 2001
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1589

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (1997). An exact bound on epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-core of an arbitrary game with side payments,” Autonoma University of Barcelona Working Paper 393.97 revised,
  2. (1991). and W.P.Heller doi
  3. (1984). Approximate cores of large games,” doi
  4. (1993). Approximate equlibrium in pure strategies for nonatomic games,” doi
  5. (1979). Asymptotic cores and asymptotic balancedness of large replica games” (Stony Brook Working Paper No. 215, Revised
  6. (1996). Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments; Nonemptiness and equal treatment,” doi
  7. (1973). Equilibrium points of nonatomic games,” doi
  8. (1983). Equilibrium points of nonatomic games; doi
  9. (2000). Equilibrium with default and exogenous collateral,” Mathematical Finance. doi
  10. (1994). Equivalence of games and markets,” doi
  11. (1997). K.P.Rath and Y.N.Sun doi
  12. (1998). Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers,” doi
  13. (1989). On Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions for games with a nonmetrizable action space and upper semi continuous payoffs,” doi
  14. (2000). Private information in large games,” doi
  15. (2001). Purifying equilibria in Bayesian games derived from noncooperative pregames,” Notes.
  16. (1974). Random economies with many interacting agents,” doi
  17. (1971). Random preferences and equilibrium analysis,” doi
  18. (2001). Small group negligibility and small group effectiveness; Two sides of the same coin,”
  19. (1983). The epsilon core of a large replica game,” doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.