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When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

By Amrita Dhillon and Ben Lockwood

Abstract

This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives. When n is large, “almost all” games can be classified as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n > 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is sufficiently replicate

Topics: HB, JF
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 1999
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1630

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