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An explicit bound on " for nonemptiness of "-cores of games

By Alexander Kovalenkov and Myrna Holtz Wooders


We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on E so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty E-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of E for non-emptiness of the E-core, the parameters describing the collection of games, and the size of the total player set. Given the parameters describing the collection, the larger the game, the smaller the E that can bechosen

Topics: HB, QA
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Year: 1999
OAI identifier:

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