Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Redistributive politics under optimally incomplete information

By Tommaso Gabrieli

Abstract

This thesis wants to contribute to the understanding of the role of collective beliefs and incomplete information in the analysis of the dynamics of inequality, growth and redistributive politics. Extensive evidence shows that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears to reflect a difference in the social perceptions regarding the determinants of individual wealth and the underlying sources of income inequality. The thesis presents a theoretical framework of beliefs and redistribution which explains this evidence through multiple politico-economic equilibria. Differently from the recent literature which obtains multiple equilibria by modeling agents characterized by psychological biases, my framework is based on standard assumptions. Multiple equilibria originate from multiple welfare maximizing levels of information for the society. Multiplewelfare-maximizing levels of information exist because increasing the informativeness of an economy produces a trade-off between a decrease in adverse selection and an increase in moral hazard. The framework provides a new micro-foundation of incomplete information as an institutional feature and answers various macroeconomic policy questions with different models

Topics: HB, JC
OAI identifier: oai:wrap.warwick.ac.uk:1988

Suggested articles

Citations

  1. (1984). A non-concavity in the value of information,”
  2. (1975). A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption,” doi
  3. (1984). A simple example of the Radner-Stigliz nonconcavity in the value of information,”
  4. (1996). A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality,” doi
  5. (1956). AContribution to the Theory of
  6. (1960). Additive Preferences,” doi
  7. (1955). Alternative Theories of Distribution,”
  8. (1979). An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility,” doi
  9. (1939). An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” doi
  10. (2006). Aspiration Traps,” Working Papers ubs0610,
  11. (2006). Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change,” in Understanding Poverty, doi
  12. (2008). Behavioural Decisions and Welfare,” The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 834,
  13. (1997). Bringing Income Distribution in From doi
  14. (1989). Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long Run Growth,” in Modern Business Cycle Theories,
  15. (1946). Capital Expansion, doi
  16. (1993). Competitive equilibria without free disposal or nonsatiation,” doi
  17. (2006). Competitive Equilibrium when Preferences Change over doi
  18. (1973). Consistent Intertemporal Decision Making,” doi
  19. (1968). Consistent planning,” doi
  20. (1980). Consistent Plans,” Review of Economic Studies, 47, 533–537.Bibliography doi
  21. (1997). Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution,”
  22. (1994). Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,” The Quarterly doi
  23. (1990). Equilibrium in CAPM without a riskless asset,” doi
  24. (2008). Equilibrium policies when preferences are time inconsistent,”
  25. (1996). Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local Connection,” Review of Economic Studies, doi
  26. (2005). Fairness and Redistribution: doi
  27. (2004). Fighting Poverty inthe US and Europe: A World of Difference. doi
  28. (1997). Golden Eggs andHyperbolic Discounting,” doi
  29. (1996). Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say,” doi
  30. (1996). Heterogeneity, Stratification, and Growth: doi
  31. (1976). How to discard free disposability - at no cost,” doi
  32. (1993). Income Distribution and doi
  33. (1994). Income distribution and investment,” doi
  34. (2006). Income distribution in macroeconomic models. doi
  35. (2001). Income Distribution,” doi
  36. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth,” doi
  37. (1991). Individual preferences for political redistribution,”
  38. (1999). Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories,” doi
  39. (2003). Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?,” doi
  40. (1998). Inequality, Redistribution and Rent-Seeking,” Ph.D. thesis, doi
  41. (1980). Inheritance and the Redistribution of Wealth,”
  42. (1997). Intergenerational Correlations in Labor Market Status: doi
  43. (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for doi
  44. (1991). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence,” Economics Working Papers91-155, doi
  45. (2001). Lookingfor EvidenceofTime-Inconsistent Preferences in Asset-Market Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of
  46. (1995). Microeconomic Theory.
  47. (1999). More equal but less mobile?: Education financing and intergenerational mobility in Italy and in the US,” doi
  48. (1956). Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility doi
  49. (1965). National Debt in a
  50. (1993). Occupational Choice and the Process of Development,” doi
  51. (1973). On the Existence of a Consistent doi
  52. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development,” doi
  53. (1981). Pareto Superiority of Unegalitarian Equilibria in doi
  54. (1993). Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, doi
  55. (2001). Preferences for Inequality: East vs.
  56. (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities,” doi
  57. (1998). Public Education and Income Distribution: A Dynamic Quantitative doi
  58. (1992). Publicversus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality,” doi
  59. (1999). Ramsey Meets Laibson in doi
  60. (2006). Redistributive Taxation with Endogenous Sentiments,” IZA Discussion Papers 2312, Institute for the Study of Labor
  61. (1996). Signaling, Incentives, and School Organization in France,
  62. (1995). Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics,” doi
  63. (2001). Social Mobility And The Demand For Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis,” The Quarterly doi
  64. (2001). Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution,” doi
  65. (1980). Stochastic processes of temporary equilibria : A note,” doi
  66. (2003). Subjective Discounting in an Exchange doi
  67. (2002). Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What Levels doi
  68. (2002). Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market,” doi
  69. (2001). The Dynamics of Exclusion and doi
  70. (1997). The Effect of National Standards and Curriculum-Based Exams
  71. (2004). The Poverty-growth-inequality triangle,” Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi Working Papers 125, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations,
  72. (2006). The recursive approach to time inconsistency,” doi
  73. (2007). The VanishingBequestTax: TheComparative Evolution of Bequest Taxation
  74. (1982). Theoretcal restrictions on the parameters of the indirect addilog demand equations – a comment.,” doi
  75. (2006). Theoretical restrictions on the parameters of the indirect addilog system revisited,” Econometric Institute
  76. (2006). Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model,” doi
  77. (1994). Transitional dynamics and the distribution of wealth in a neoclassical growth model,” doi
  78. (2000). UnequalSocieties: IncomeDistribution and the Social Contract,”
  79. (1996). Wage Inequality and Segregation,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1777, Harvard -Institute of Economic Research.
  80. (2004). Why do Americans work so much more than doi
  81. (1993). Workings of a City: Location, Education, doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.