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Bank runs and noisy signals

By Juntip Boonprakaikawe and Sayantan Ghosal


We show that even with noisy signals on the quality of a bank's assets multiple equilibria exist in models of banking. We argue that the conditions under which this happens arise naturally in models of banking

Topics: HG, HD61
Publisher: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Year: 2001
OAI identifier:

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